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ABSTRACT. Motivated by recent empirical findings on money demand, the paper presents
a general equilibrium model where agents have limited participation in financial markets
and use money to smooth consumption. In such setup, investment is not optimal because
only a fraction of households participate in financial markets in each period. Optimal mon-
etary policy substantially increases welfare by changing investment decisions over the busi-
ness cycle, but adverse redistributive effects limit the scope for an active monetary policy.
Recent developments in the heterogeneous-agents literature are used to develop a tractable
framework with aggregate shocks, where optimal monetary policy can be analyzed.
JEL : E41, E52, E32
Keywords : Limited participation, incomplete markets, optimal policy.
The rapid expansion of central bank balance sheets in the US, Japan and the Euro area
after the 2008 crisis has rejuvenated old but deep questions: What are the real effects
of money injections? Do they affect investment and economic activity ? Should money
creation be used to affect investment dynamics ? For policy makers, the link between
monetary policy and investment is explicit. The Federal Reserve Board actually produces
a systematic assessment of business investment when presenting monetary policy deci-
sions. Reading the minutes of the Fed, one observes that the prospects of business fixed
investment are discussed in the process of policy making.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the conditions under which optimal monetary policy
should consider investment, in a simple but micro-founded monetary model. It develops
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a tractable model where agents have limited participation in financial markets and face
aggregate shocks. In this setup, agents use money to smooth consumption between peri-
ods at which they adjust their financial portfolio. The focus on limited participation as the
key friction comes from two sets of results. First, the distribution of money across house-
holds generated by this friction is much more similar to the data than the distribution
generated by alternative money demand (Alvarez and Lippi, 2009; Cao, Meh, Rios-Rull
and Terajima, 2012; Ragot, 2014). Reproducing a relevant money distribution is key to
assess the redistributive effect of monetary policy. Second, Kaplan, Violante and Weidner
(2014) and Kaplan and Violante (2014) have shown that introducing limited participation
allows to better reproduce the empirical consumption/saving choice after a fiscal trans-
fer. Thus both the incentives to save and to hold money can be captured by this simple
friction. The main result of the paper is that this friction implies that investment is not
optimal and that monetary policy should indeed restore the right incentives to save over
the business cycle. It thus provides a rationale for monetary policy to consider investment
over the business cycle.
The paper first presents a simple general-equilibrium model to derive formal proofs.
Then, it provides a more general framework to study optimal monetary policy with a
simplified but realistic money distribution. It is already known that limited participation
generates some relevant sort-run effects, such as the liquidity effect of money injection:
An increase in the quantity of money decreases the nominal interest rate, as only a part of
the population must absorb the new money created (Lucas, 1990; Alvarez, Atkeson and
Edmond, 2009, among others). Nevertheless, this promising literature has faced some dif-
ficulties in dealing with agents’ heterogeneity (see the literature review below). This has
prevented the introduction of additional features which are important for understanding
the business cycle, such as long-lasting heterogeneity, aggregate shock and capital accu-
mulation. Developments of tractable environments in the heterogeneous agent literature
allow deriving new results about optimal monetary policy in these economies.
Analyzing the simple model, one first finds that the distortions generated by limited
participation are surprisingly not simple. In general, capital accumulation is not optimal,
as a part of the income generated by the capital stock is distributed as wages to households
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who do not participate in financial markets. The direction of the distortions (for instance
the over or under accumulation of capital after a technology shock) crucially depends
on the persistence of the technology shock, because of income and substitution effects.
Money creation can restore the first-best allocation by affecting capital accumulation. For
instance, to increase aggregate saving, money creation induces a transfer between non-
participating and participating households, which also implements optimal consumption
levels for all agents. In addition, the optimal allocation cannot be implemented by a time-
varying capital tax, because it would distort the intertemporal consumption smoothing.
In this sense, monetary policy is a powerful tool to restore the optimal level of investment.
The second part of the paper presents the generalized model to characterize the direc-
tion of the distortion, when a simplified but more realistic income and money distribution
is reproduced. It presents a model where households face both idiosyncratic and aggre-
gate shocks, and participate infrequently in financial markets. The model is developed to
capture the self-insurance motive and to introduce limited participation in a tractable en-
vironment. It extends previous work based on periodic reinsurance (Alvarez et al., 2009,
Khan and Thomas, 2015, Challe, Matheron, Ragot and Rubio-Ramirez, 2016) to introduce
capital accumulation and a richer heterogeneity to reproduce the US money and income
distribution. Optimal monetary policy is derived in this setup.
It is found that optimal monetary policy is countercyclical. Active monetary policy
contributes to increase inflation after a negative technology shock and to decrease infla-
tion after a positive technology shock. This policy generates an additional increase in the
capital stock by 5% after a positive technology shock. The tradeoff faced by monetary
policy is between improving capital accumulation and lowering risk-sharing, by increas-
ing inequality. Optimal monetary policy raises welfare by a roughly 0.2% consumption
equivalent through its ability both to partially insure households against the aggregate
risk and to affect capital accumulation over the business cycle. This welfare gain is high
compared to the gains of eliminating business cycles in representative agent economies.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to analyse optimal monetary policy with capital
accumulation, limited participation and aggregate shocks. All these results are derived
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with flexible prices. This assumption is made to identify the key mechanisms. The poten-
tial new effects generated by nominal frictions are discussed as concluding remarks.
The rest of the Introduction is the literature review. Section 1 presents the simple model,
where distortions of the market economy and the optimal monetary policy are identified.
Section 2 presents the general model to quantify the mechanisms. Section 3 is the Conclu-
sion.
Related literature.
Limited Participation and money demand. This paper considers limited participation as
the key friction for monetary policy.1 Limited participation is indeed a modeling strat-
egy that is consistent with the data (Bricker, Dettling, Henriques, Hsu, Moore, Sabelhaus,
Thompson and Windle, 2014 shows that roughly half of the US population participates
in financial markets). The work of Alvarez and Lippi (2009) and (2014) or Ragot (2014)
shows that models with limited participation in financial markets can reproduce the dis-
tribution of money. Khan and Thomas (2015) prove that this friction is useful to reproduce
the correlation between consumption and the short-run interest rate. On the fiscal side,
Kaplan and Violante (2014) show that limited participation can explain the high marginal
propensity to consume after a fiscal shock. In this literature, the contribution of the current
paper is to identify the optimal policy with capital accumulation.
Optimal monetary policy and redistribution. Monetary policy with heterogeneous agents
was first studied in economies without capital (labeled pure currency economies by Wal-
lace, 2014). In these models, money is the only store of value. (Bewley, 1983; Kehoe,
Levine and Woodford, 1992; Algan, Challe and Ragot, 2010; Grossman and Weiss, 1983 or
the search-theoretic model of Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993 as in Williamson, 2006 or Gomis-
Porqueras and Sanches, 2013 among many others). Recently, Auclert (2017) identifies the
redistributive channels of monetary policy with nominal asset and a fixed capital stock.
Concerning optimal policies, Lippi, Ragni and Trachter (2015) derive optimal policy in a
two-agent economy with aggregate shocks, following Scheinkman and Weiss (1986). Bil-
biie (2008), Motta and Tirelli (2012), Nuno and Thomas (2017), Challe (2017) and Bilbiie
1 Limited participation models were first introduced in monetary economics to rationalize the liquidity
effect of money injections as the seminal contribution of Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984)
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and Ragot (2017) derive optimal policy with heterogeneous agents and additional frictions
in the goods or labor market. All these models abstract from capital accumulation, and
optimal monetary policy is a trade-off between consumption-smoothing and insurance.
Recent models in the search-theory of money consider both money and capital to char-
acterize optimal policies at the steady state (Aruoba and Chuch, 2010; Boragan, Waller
and Wright, 2011). Using limited participation as the key friction, I can derive new results
with aggregate technology shocks. For instance, optimal monetary policy can be either
procyclical or countercyclical depending on the persistence of the shock. Finally, the re-
distributive effects of monetary policy generate new results absent from representative
agent models, studied in Chari and Kehoe (1999).
Old literature. It is interesting to note that both the market failure induced by monetary
saving, and the role of monetary policy in affecting the incentives to save, were discussed
by Hayek. The idea that monetary policy can induce capital accumulation was indeed
strongly defended by Hayek (and all the Austrian school) and called ”forced saving”.
(Hayek, 1967). He argued forcefully that monetary policy shouldn’t generate excessive
fluctuations in the investment rate. The present analysis highlights an additional con-
straint on monetary policy: It shouldn’t increase too much inequality over the business
cycle.
1. THE SIMPLE MODEL
The simple model is based on two simplifying assumptions. First, some agents al-
ways participate in financial markets, whereas others never participate. Second, non-
participating households use money to smooth deterministic income fluctuations. These
assumptions are relaxed in the quantitative analysis presented in Section 2.
Time is discrete and periods are indexed by t = 0, 1... The model features a closed econ-
omy populated by a continuum of households indexed by i and uniformly distributed
along the unit interval, as well as a representative firm. Households have a CRRA utility
function u (c) = (c1−σ − 1)/(1− σ) if σ 6= 1 and u (c) = log (c) if σ = 1. The discount fac-
tor is β. It is assumed that the economy is composed of two types of households. There is
a fraction Ω > 0 of agents, denoted as N−households, who must pay a fixed cost κN each
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time they want to participate in financial markets. The remaining fraction 1−Ω of house-
holds, denoted as P−households, don’t pay any cost to participate in financial markets.
The cost κN is determined in Section 1.2 below. It is high enough that N-households never
participate in financial markets. All households can participate in the money market at no
cost2.
1.1. Agents.
1.1.1. Non-participating households. N−households are denoted by the superscript n. A
fraction Ω/2 consumes in odd periods and receives labor income in even periods. The
other fraction Ω/2 consumes in even periods and receives labor income in odd periods,
which is a modeling strategy similar to Woodford (1990). When working, households
supply one unit of labor and get a nominal wage Wt. In all periods, households receive
a net nominal transfer Ptτt, where Pt is the price of one unit of final goods and τt is the
transfer in real terms. As these households will not participate in financial markets, they
use money only to smooth consumption3.
Households cannot issue money. When they consume, it is guessed (and checked) that
they spend all their money holdings, and the condition for this to be the case is provided
below. From now on, real variables are denoted with lowercase. For instance, Mnt is
the nominal amount of money held by the households at the beginning of each period,
and the real amount is mnt = M
n
t /Pt. Denote as c
n
t the consumption of non-participating
households in period t, then Ptcnt = M
n
t−1 + Ptτt, or in real terms:
cnt =
mnt−1
1 + pit
+ τt (1)
where pit = Pt/Pt−1 − 1 is the net inflation rate. When households do not consume, their
money demand is their total income. As they spent all their money the previous period,
2This participation costs structure is a simplification of the general framework of Alvarez, Atkeson and
Kehoe (2002). It allows studying limited participation in a simple environment, as in Alvarez and Lippi
(2014) for instance. Introducing participation cost for participating households would only complicate the
algebra.
3Money has a positive value because it is a store of value in this infinite-horizon setting. The theory of
money embedded in the simple model is thus from Samuelson (1958).
LIMITED PARTICIPATION, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 7
their real money demand is:
mnt = wt + τt (2)
From standard dynamic optimization, the condition for households not to hold money
when they consume is:
u′ (cnt ) > β2Et
1
1 + pit+1
1
1 + pit+2
u′
(
cnt+2
)
The condition is that marginal gain from consuming an additional unit of money in the
current period is higher than the expected gain from consuming it two periods ahead.
1.1.2. Participating Households. Variables concerning P−households are indicated by the
superscript p. These households supply one unit of labor every period. P−households
can buy two types of assets: money, and the capital of firms. As money will always be
a dominated asset4, participating household never hold money in equilibrium. In period
t, they buy a quantity kpt+1 of financial assets, which yield a real return 1 + rt+1 between
period t and t + 1. The budget constraint of a representative P−households is, in real
terms:
kpt+1 + c
p
t = wt + τt + (1 + rt) k
p
t , (3)
where cpt is real consumption, wt is real labor income and (1 + rt) k
p
t is the return of finan-
cial savings. Standard intertemporal utility maximization yields the Euler equation:
u′
(
cpt
)
= βEt (1 + rt+1) u′
(
cpt+1
)
, (4)
and the transversality condition is limτ→∞ βτEu′
(
cpt+τ
)
kpt+τ = 0
1.1.3. Firms. There is a unit mass of firms, which produce with capital and labor. Capital
must be installed one period before production, and it fully depreciates in production. The
production function is Cobb-Douglas with a capital share µ : Yt = AtK
µ
t L
1−µ
t and where
Kt, Lt and At are respectively the capital stock, the labor hired and the technology level at
4It will be assumed that shocks are small enough such that the zero lower bound does not bind in the
equilibrium under consideration, so that money is a dominated asset.
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the beginning of period t. Profit maximization is maxK,L AtK
µ
t L
1−µ
t −wtLt − (1 + rt) Kt. It
yields the following two first-order conditions:
wt = (1− µ) AtKµt L−µt (5)
1 + rt = µAtK
µ−1
t L
1−µ
t (6)
The level of technology At is the only exogenous stochastic process in the economy.
At = eat , where at follows an AR(1) process:
at = ρaat−1 + εat (7)
where the shock εat is a white noiseN
(
0, σ2a
)
. The steady-state technology level is defined
as At = 1.
Monetary policy and taxes. The new money is created by lump-sum transfers given to all
households. The central bank creates a nominal quantity of money MCBt . The real quantity
is mCBt = M
CB
t /Pt . Denote as M
tot
t the total nominal quantity of money. The law of motion
of Mtot is simply Mtott = M
tot
t−1 + M
CB
t , or in real terms:
mtott =
mtott−1
1 + pit
+ mCBt (8)
The new money is created by a lump-sum transfer to all agents:
τt = mCBt (9)
1.2. Equilibrium definition, steady state. There are four markets in this economy. First,
the equilibrium of the money market is:
mtott =
Ω
2
mnt (10)
The previous equality stipulates that half of the N-households (Ω/2) hold money at the
end of each period. As only P−households participate in financial markets, the equilib-
rium of the financial markets is:
(1−Ω) kpt = Kt (11)
The goods market equilibrium is:
(1−Ω) cpt +
Ωcnt
2
+ Kt+1 = Yt (12)
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As half N−households and all P−households supply one unit of labor, the labor market
equilibrium is Lt = L, where:
L ≡ 1−Ω+ Ω
2
= 1−Ω/2 (13)
Given the process for the technology and for a given monetary policy, an equilibrium of
this economy is a sequence of individual choices and prices {cnt , mnt , kpt , cpt , rt,pit, wt} and
a sequence of money stock, central bank profits and taxes {mtott , mCBt , τt} such that agents
make optimal choices, the aggregate quantity of money is consistent with money creation
and markets clear.
1.2.1. Steady state. The steady state of the model gives first insights. In steady state, real
variables are constant and indicated with a star. For instance, A∗ = 1. The real interest rate
is given by the Euler equation of participating agents (4). It implies that 1+ r∗ = 1/β. One
easily deduces the steady-state capital stock from equations (5) and (6): K∗ = L (µβ)
1
1−µ
and w∗ = (1− µ) (βµ)
µ
1−µ . As pi∗ is the steady-state net inflation rate, using equations
(2)-(9), one finds the consumption of N−households:
cn∗ = (1− µ) (βµ)
µ
1−µ
1 + 1β
Ω
2 pi
∗
1 +
(
1− 1β Ω2
)
pi∗
The consumption of P−households is given by:
cp∗ =
(
1 + (1− β) L
1−Ω
µ
1− µ + pi
∗ Ω/2
1 + pi∗ (1−Ω/2)
)
(βµ)
µ
1−µ
One can check that Ctot∗ = (1−Ω) cp∗ + Ω2 cn∗ does not depend on the inflation rate, but
that cp∗ increases with pi whereas cn∗ decreases with pi∗.
Indeed, only the money-holders pay the inflation tax, whereas the proceed of the infla-
tion tax is equally given back to all households. As a consequence, steady-state inflation is
just a transfer from money holders (N−households) to non-money holders (P−households).
This transfer doesn’t affect output because the real interest rate is pinned down by prefer-
ences of participating agents. 5
5 N−households don’t participate in financial markets if the participation cost κN is high enough such
that the total return of their saving in money would be higher than the one in financial markets. This
provides a lower bound to the participation cost of N-households: κN > (1− µ) (βµ)
µ
1−µ
(
1
β − 11+pi∗
)
. It
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1.3. Discussion of the model. Before solving the model, it may be useful to discuss the
assumptions. This model is designed to be the simplest model with two features: 1)
Money is used by non-participating agents to smooth consumption, as in the Baumol-
Tobin literature 2) Participating agents invest in capital, affecting prices in general equi-
librium. It can be thought either as a monetary extension of Woodford (1990) or as intro-
ducing capital accumulation in simplified limited participation models along the lines of
Alvarez et al. (2009) or Khan and Thomas (2015).
To obtain a tractable framework, this simple model doesn’t admittedly consider other
margins studied in the literature. First, the participation structure is fixed because there
is constant segmentation across households. This modeling strategy, followed by Alvarez
et al. (2009) or Khan and Thomas (2015) can be generalized at the cost of more algebra.
For instance, Alvarez et al. (2002) consider a model where the participation decision may
change in the business cycle to obtain a more time-varying velocity of money. Kaplan
and Violante (2014) also consider this margin in a quantitative model. Second, there is
no change in price dispersion after a money shock in my model. This could be obtained
either with Calvo-type sticky prices or with flexible prices and good market segmentation
as in Williamson (2008). The gain of these two simplifying assumptions is to be able to
introduce capital accumulation in general equilibrium and to be able to derive optimal
policies in a transparent way, what is new in this literature to the best of my knowledge.
A third implication of this simple model is more problematic. The distribution of money
is not very realistic, what may be misleading as the main mechanism will rely on the
redistributive effects of monetary policy. This limit of the simple model will justify the
introduction of a more general setup in Section 2.
1.4. Optimal allocation and steady state comparison. Without loss of generality, it is as-
sumed that the planner gives a weightωp to P−households and a weight 1 to N−households.
is assumed that this inequality is fulfilled and that shocks are small enough such N−households never
participate in financial markets.
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The tilde is used to indicate the optimal allocation. For instance c˜nt is the optimal consump-
tion of a N-household in period t. The intertemporal social welfare function is:
max E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
Ω
2
u (c˜nt ) +ωp (1−Ω) u
(
c˜pt
))
(14)
and the resource constraint of the planner is:
Ωc˜nt
2
+ (1−Ω) c˜pt + K˜t = AtK˜µt−1L1−µ (15)
Solving the program one finds:
c˜nt /c˜
p
t = ω
− 1σ
p (16)
In words, the ratio of consumption of participating and non-participating households is
constant over the business cycle, which is a direct implication of full risk-sharing. With
this property the Euler equation is:
u′
(
c˜pt
)
= βEt (1 + r˜t+1) u′
(
c˜pt+1
)
(17)
where 1 + r˜t = µAtK˜
µ−1
t L
1−µ is the marginal productivity of capital in the optimal al-
location. The resource constraint of the planner is K˜t+1 +
(
Ω
2
(
ωp
)− 1σ + (1−Ω)) c˜pt =
AtK˜
µ
t L
1−µ. This budget constraint and the Euler equation (17) fully characterize the opti-
mal allocation.
One can now compare the market and optimal allocation in steady state, i.e. when there
is no money creation mCBt = 0 and where A = 1. The following Proposition summarizes
the result. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. 1) The steady state value of the capital stock is optimal in the market economy:
K∗ = K˜∗.
2)In addition, if
ωp =
(
1 +
µ
1− µ (1− β)
1−Ω/2
1−Ω
)σ
(18)
then the steady-state market equilibrium is optimal when pi∗ = 0: cn∗ = c˜n∗ and cp = c˜p∗.
First, in the market economy, the capital stock is optimal in steady state. Indeed, the
steady-state real interest rate (and thus the marginal return on capital) is pinned down by
the households’ discount factor in the market and optimal economy: 1 + r∗ = 1 + r˜∗ = 1β
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(see equations 4 and 17). Second, for the value of the weight ωp given in the Proposition,
the inflation rate pi = 0 generates the optimal steady-state market allocation6. As steady-
state inflation is only a transfer across households, there exists a pareto weight such that
the optimal inflation rate is 0. In what follows, it is assumed that ωp has the value given in
the Proposition and that the optimal steady-state inflation rate is thus pi = 0, but it should
be clear that all the results below are valid for an arbitrary weight ωp. Considering the
case where the optimal steady-state inflation rate is 0 simplifies the algebra, in order to
focus on the business cycle distortions implied by limited participation. 7
1.5. Distortions in the market economy. To identify the distortions of the market econ-
omy in the business cycle, the allocation is first analyzed under the assumption that mon-
etary policy is inactive: mCBt = 0. As a consequence, the nominal money stock M¯
tot is
constant and τt = 0 in all periods. Using the money market equilibrium and money de-
mand (2) and (10), one finds that the price level in each period is Pt = 2M¯
tot
Ωwt , and the
inflation rate is thus 1 + pit = wt−1/wt. As a consequence, from (1), the consumption of
non-participating households is simply:
cnt = wt
The structure of the equilibrium is thus quite simple. Non-participating households con-
sume the real wage in all periods. The model is thus close to consumer-saver models,
where some agents consume all their income (as Judd, 1985 for an early example).
To save some space, the difference between the optimal and market allocation is sum-
marized in two Propositions. The proofs are based on a first-order approximation of the
model and they are left in Appendix.
Proposition 2. If σ = 1, the market and the optimal allocations are the same.
The first result is that the existence of distortions depends on the utility function: When
households have log-utility, the market allocation is optimal (at the first order) even when
6The fact that the optimal steady-state inflation rate does not necessarily produce the Friedman rule in
an heterogeneous-agent economy is the standard result of Kehoe et al. (1992)
7When markets are complete and when all households participate in financial markets, it is easy to check
that the dynamics of aggregate consumption and capital are the same in the optimal allocation.
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there is limited participation in financial markets. Indeed, the steady-state is optimal and,
with log-utility, households consume a constant share of their income in all periods, which
is independent from factor prices. Hence, this share is the same in the market and optimal
economies.
Following the business-cycle literature, the case σ > 1 and σ close to 1 is considered as
the relevant one (see Hall, 2010, chap. 2 for a survey). With these assumptions we can
derive additional analytical results about capital accumulation.8
To do so, denote as ∂
̂˜K
∂εa the contemporaneous increase in the total capital stock after a
small TFP shock in the optimal allocation, and as ∂K̂∂εa the contemporaneous increase in the
total capital stock in the market allocation. We now compare ∂
̂˜K
∂εa and
∂K̂
∂εa .
Proposition 3. If σ is close to 1, there is a threshold ρ¯ > 0, such that:
- If ρ < ρ¯ then ∂
̂˜K
∂εa >
∂Kˆ
∂εa
- If ρ > ρ¯ then ∂
̂˜K
∂εa <
∂Kˆ
∂εa
The Proposition states that the reaction of the total capital stock can be higher or lower
than the one in the first-best allocation depending on the persistence of the technology
shock. Hence, there can be either over or under investment after a technology shock. In-
deed, when the persistence of the technology shock is low, the central planner would like
the economy to save a lot to benefit from the temporary increase in TFP. In the market
economy, participating households, do not receive all the wealth generated by invest-
ment because a part of this return is given as wages to non-participating households. The
wealth effect is smaller than it would be under complete markets. As a consequence, they
do not save enough. When the persistence is high, the economy experiences a high wealth
effect and the central planner would like households to increase consumption to benefit
from the persistent increase in TFP. Again, as participating households in the market econ-
omy do not perceive the full wealth generated by the increase in TFP, they do not increase
consumption enough compared to the first best, and the capital stock is too high.
8When σ is very high, income effects create non-realistic behavior (such as a huge fall in saving after a
positive technology shock), which prevents analytical characterization.
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As a short summary, the market economy under-reacts compared to the first best alloca-
tion, for both income and substitution effect. The effect of limited participation on capital
accumulation is thus surprisingly complex, as it depends on both the shape of the utility
function and the persistence of the technology shock. The key mechanism identified in
this Proposition is that participating households don’t experience the right wealth effect
after a TFP shock. We will see below that optimal policy redistributes wealth across house-
holds to restore the right wealth effects. It will do so, not by affecting marginal returns,
but by generating non-distorting transfers across agents.
1.6. Optimal monetary policy. Optimal monetary policy is now derived in the non-linear
environment. We consider that the central bank creates some money in each period after
observing the state of the economy. As it is shown that the optimal monetary policy imple-
ments the first best, there are no commitment issues, as the central bank has no incentives
to deviate in any period.
To identify the effect of monetary policy in the non-linear environment, one can rewrite
the budget constraint of participating households, using the budget constraint (3), to-
gether with the equations (9) and (11):
Kt+1 + (1−Ω) cpt = Yt − wt
Ω
2
+ (1−Ω) mCBt︸ ︷︷ ︸
money transfer
(19)
The previous equality shows that monetary policy acts as a lump-sum transfer to partic-
ipating households (as a general equilibrium effect). Indeed, money is transferred to all
households, whereas only non-participating ones hold money and pay the inflation tax.
As a consequence, money creation is a transfer from non-participating to participating
households, as in the steady state. The term ”money transfer” thus captures the redis-
tributive effect of money creation between the two types of agents.
One can write the budget constraint of the central planner (15) in a similar form:
K˜t+1 + (1−Ω) c˜pt = Y˜t − w˜t
Ω
2
+
Ω
2
(w˜t − c˜nt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
missing saving
(20)
where Y˜t and w˜t ≡ (1− µ) AtK˜µt L−µ are respectively the level of output and the mar-
ginal productivity of labor in the optimal allocation. The time-varying difference between
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the income and consumption of non-participating households appears in this budget con-
straint. This difference is denoted the ”missing saving”, because it is the part of the income
of non-participating agents that is actually invested in the optimal allocation, but not in
the market economy. This difference is key for the results. Indeed, the planner would like
that non-participation agents save, but it is not the case when there is no money creation,
as cnt = wt. As a consequence, if monetary policy is able to implement a transfer to par-
ticipating agents, which compensates for the ”missing saving”, it may generate the right
saving decision for participating households, and thus the right wage rate and consump-
tion for non-participating agents.
The following Proposition shows that this intuition is right.
Proposition 4. 1) An active monetary policy can implement the first best allocation.
2) The optimal money rule has the following form:
mCBt = H (Ω, At, Kt) (21)
where the function H is such that H (0, At, Kt) = 0 and H (Ω, 1, K∗) = 0.
The second part of the Proposition shows that the money rule depends on technology
and the aggregate capital stock. When all households participate in financial markets
Ω = 0, the incentives to save are optimal and no money is created H = 0, as expected.
Moreover, in steady state H (Ω, 1, K∗) = 0, as the steady-state allocation is optimal. The
time-variation in the money created by the central bank reproduces the transfer, which
corresponds to the ”missing saving” of non-participating households identified in the
discussion of equation (20). As a consequence, the consumption-saving choice of par-
ticipating households is optimal. The consumption of non-participating households is
thus also optimal, because of the goods market equilibrium.
One can derive some intuitions for the properties of the optimal monetary policy from
Proposition 3. When the persistence of the technology shock is low (close to 0) and the
utility function is not too concave, the economy under-invests after a positive technology
shock. Optimal monetary policy increases capital accumulation, and it is thus procycli-
cal. When the persistence of the technology shock is high (close to 1), then the market
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economy accumulates too much capital after a positive technology shock. Optimal mon-
etary policy decreases capital accumulation after a persistent positive technology shock.
Optimal monetary policy is thus countercyclical.
1.7. Monetary policy or fiscal policy ? Monetary policy can implement the first best by
inducing optimal transfers across agents. One could argue that this should be the role
of fiscal policy. As capital dynamic is not optimal in the business cycle, one could think
that a time-varying capital tax could implement the first best. This intuition is not correct.
Indeed, the distortion appears as a non-optimal wealth effect, not as a distorted marginal
return on capital. To see this, assume that in period t the central planner introduces a time-
varying capital tax λt on interest income on period t savings (the way the inflation tax is
redistributed to households is irrelevant for the proof). The Euler equation of participation
agents in period t is:
u′
(
cpt
)
= βEt (1 + (1− λt) rt+1) u′
(
cpt+1
)
where rt+1 is the before-tax marginal productivity of capital. If the first best is imple-
mented, the optimal allocation must satisfies u′
(
c˜pt
)
= βEt (1 + (1− λt) r˜t+1) u′
(
c˜pt+1
)
, in
all periods. But it is known from (17) that u′
(
c˜pt
)
= βEt (1 + r˜t+1) u′
(
c˜pt+1
)
. As a conse-
quence, we must have 0 = λtEtr˜t+1u′
(
c˜pt+1
)
. This implies λt = 0, in all periods, because
we assume small shocks and r∗u′ (cp∗) 6= 0. The next Proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 5. The first best can be achieved only if capital taxes are zero in all periods.
Finally, it should be clear that a time-varying lump-sum transfer between participating
and non-participating households equal to the ”missing saving” can reproduce the first-
best allocation. As monetary policy described above, such policy would restore the right
wealth effects without distorting the marginal incentive to save of participating agents.
Monetary policy has nevertheless a relative advantage. Indeed, optimal monetary pol-
icy depends only on aggregate variables, and the monetary authorities have no infor-
mation about the identity of who is actually participating or not. Monetary policy thus
requires less information-processing than fiscal policy.
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1.8. A remark on inside money and money creation. The result about the distortion of
the market economy does not depend on money being outside money. The results would
be the same if money were inside money, because the time-varying return on inside money
is different from the marginal productivity of capital. This result is proved in the Online
Appendix, to save some space, but the intuition is simple. In general equilibrium what is
not consumed must be invested. As a consequence, all the monetary savings (be it outside
or inside money) are invested. The key distortion relies on the incentives to save, and thus
on the return on the money.
The fact that monetary policy can implement the first best does not rely on the assump-
tion of lump-sum money creation, and the results are the same if money is created by
open-market operations. The results are thus robust to many alternative way to create
money. Only in the special case where the new money is given to non-participating
agents in a lump-sum manner, does monetary policy not generate redistribution across
agents (as the inflation tax is paid back to the money holders), and the first best cannot be
implemented. Any other process of money creation allows implementing the first best.9
This simple model has shown that the time-variations in the capital stock are not opti-
mal when there is limited participation in financial markets. It has identified a new role
for monetary policy, which is to affect capital accumulation in the business cycle because
of only one friction, which is limited participation in financial markets. As summarized
in the introduction, this role for monetary has not been identified yet, to the best of my
knowledge. This simple model is based on simplifying assumptions, some of which are
relaxed in the next Section.
2. THE GENERAL MODEL
The previous simple model can be obviously generalized in many dimensions, as dis-
cussed in Section 1.3. This Section considers three specific extensions, to bring the model
closer to money theory and to get the direction of the redistribution right. The simple
9In a previous version of this paper optimal monetary policy was also studied at the zero lower bound
(ZLB) as in Adam and Billi, 2010 among others. As the ZLB is analyzed in a separate literature, it is now
studied in a different paper.
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TABLE 1. Summary of the US distribution of money, using SCF 2004
Households in the income distribution
Bottom 50% Top 50%
Money 3,303 12,980
Income (in $) 26,000 137,000
model has indeed three shortcomings. First, non-participating agents don’t have a con-
sumption saving choice, due to the assumption that they both consume and receive their
labor income every other period. This assumption excludes the cost of inflation as a dis-
tortion to the consumption-saving choice, which is typically studied in the monetary and
Bewley literature. Second, participating agents don’t hold money, which is inconsistent
with the data, as discussed below. Reproducing a realistic (although simplified) distribu-
tion is key to assess the redistributive effet of monetary policy. Third, money is created by
lump-sum transfers, which is an obvious simplification. Introducing open-market opera-
tions is important not to give monetary policy an arbitrary advantage as a tool to provide
insurance.
I first discuss the shape of the money distribution, before presenting the modeling strat-
egy. Using the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), two groups of US households can be
identified according to their holdings of money and financial assets. First, roughly 50% of
the US population doesn’t participate in the stock market either directly or indirectly. This
fraction is roughly constant, and non-participating households are mostly low-income
households (Bricker et al., 2014). For this reason, the US population is divided into two
groups of equal size: the bottom 50% and the top 50% in the income distribution. Table 1
provides summary statistics for the two groups of households.
Households in the Top 50%, have an income roughly 5 times higher than households
in the Bottom 50% (137,000 compared to 26,000). A narrow definition of money, namely
M1 (checking deposits and currency) is used, so as not to over-estimate the redistributive
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effect of monetary policy10. The Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) 200411 is used to
obtain data on checking accounts. As the SCF does not include data on currency, I use
the Kaplan et al. (2014) strategy to estimate the currency holdings: In US data, the ratio of
total currency to the total checking account is 32%. I thus increase the checking account
of each group of households by 32%. Households in the Top 50% hold much more money
than households in the Bottom 50%, but the ratio of money over income is smaller for
high-income households (9.5) than for low-income households (12.7), as found by Erosa
and Ventura (2002).
This money distribution is known to be best reproduced by limited-participation and
incomplete-market models (Alvarez and Lippi, 2009 and 2014). Indeed, models introduc-
ing a cash-in-advance constraint, even with increasing returns-to-scale transaction tech-
nology, cannot reproduce the observed heterogeneity in money holdings because the dis-
tribution of money is very different from the distribution of consumption expenditures
(Ragot, 2014). For this reason, the following model presents a generalization of the previ-
ous simple model, introducing a more general incomplete market and limited participa-
tion structure. The bottom 50% households will not participate in financial markets and
smooth consumption with money, as in the Bewley model. The top 50% will participate
infrequently in financial markets, as in the Baumol-Tobin model of money demand12.
Incomplete insurance markets and limited participation models are known to be very
difficult to analyze with aggregate shocks. To my knowledge, simulation techniques do
not allow to study such environments in the general case and with aggregate shocks, ex-
cluding the derivation of optimal policies. To capture the essence of limited participation
10A broader definition would not alter money inequality, as M1 and M2 are roughly similarly distributed
in the US population (Ragot, 2014), but the quantity of money (and thus the tax base of the inflation tax)
would be higher.
11The 2004 SCF survey is used to avoid the high house prices of the 2007 survey and the low nominal
interest rate in the 2010 survey. Nevertheless, it has been checked that the distribution of money does not
vary a lot between the various surveys.
12Infrequent participation in financial markets is also studied inVissing-Jogensen, 2002 and Alvarez and
Lippi, 2009.
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and market incompleteness, and to be able to define an optimal monetary policy with ag-
gregate shocks, I introduce two simplifying assumptions. First, following Alvarez et al.
(2009) and Alvarez and Lippi (2014) , I assume that the participation structure is fixed.
As the income levels of participating and non-participating households are very different,
this assumption can be micro-founded by a participation cost, but I abstract from this to
simplify the algebra. Second and more importantly, I use methodological tools to simplify
incomplete market models. This modeling strategy can be thought of as an extension of
Lucas (1990), who introduces perfect insurance within families, to allow for only partial
insurance as in Alvarez et al. (2009), Khan and Thomas (2015), Challe et al. (2016). It is
assumed that there is perfect insurance within some groups of the population living on
”islands”, but that there is no insurance across islands. The key modeling strategy is to
design a timing of market opening such that the model generates Euler equations for each
household, which are consistent with results in the incomplete insurance market litera-
ture, but where the heterogeneity is limited to a finite number of household types. It is
thus not necessary to follow a large distribution of agents as in Krussel and Smith (1998).
In this setup, optimal policy with aggregate shocks can be studied13.
2.1. Assets and production. There are now three types of assets in this economy. The first
one is money. It can be held by all households. As before, the net inflation rate between
period t and period t + 1 is denoted pit+1 =
Pt+1−Pt
Pt . The second one consists of claims on
the capital stock. The real return between period t and period t + 1 is denoted rt+1. The
third one is nominal bonds. The nominal interest rate between period t and period t + 1
is denoted it. Nominal bonds are introduced to model open market operations.
It is now assumed that capital doesn’t fully depreciate in production, the depreciation
rate being λ. Profit maximization is maxK,L AtKµL1−µ − wL − (rt + λ) K, where L is the
13In monetary economics this assumption is used for instance by Shi, 1997 to study the decentralization
of exchange, without having to keep track of the money distribution. Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante,
2014 use the same modeling strategy in a model based on Constantinides and Duffie, 1996, where idiosyn-
cratic shocks are persistent. Heathcote and Perri, 2015 also use a similar strategy. The contribution of the
current paper is to generalize this strategy to a limited participation framework. See Ragot, 2017 for a survey
of this literature.
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labor supply in efficient units. First-order conditions for the firm are:
rt + λ = µAtK
µ−1
t L
1−µ
t and wt = (1− µ) AtKµt L−µt (22)
with At = eat , and the process for at given by (7).
2.2. Households. All households have the same CRRA period utility function u(.), and
have the same discount factor β. They pay lump-sum taxes denoted as τt. The population
is composed ofΩN ≡ 50% of N−households, who do not participate in financial markets,
but who can hold money. It is composed of ΩP ≡ 50% of households, who are denoted as
participating agents or P−households, and who have access to both money and financial
markets.
N−Households N−households don’t participate in financial markets, but they face an
idiosyncratic risk. Following the literature on uninsurable risk, it is assumed that N−households
can be either employed or unemployed. An employed household stays employed next
period with a probability α (and falls into unemployment with a probability 1− α). The
household receives a wage wt. When unemployed, households stay unemployed with a
probability ρ (and find work with a probability 1− ρ). The household gets a revenue from
home production δN < wt. In other words, the transition matrix for the labor risk is: α 1− α
1− ρ ρ

As this transition matrix is not time-varying, the constant fraction of employed house-
holds among N−households is:
n =
1− ρ
2− α− ρ (23)
and the unemployment rate is 1− n.
Insurance structure. It is assumed that N−households belong to a family, which has two
locations. Employed households live on an island, denoted as E−island, where there is
full risk-sharing. All employed N−households in the E−island supply one unit of labor
and earn an after-tax real wage wt − τt. Unemployed agents live on an island, denoted
as U−island, where there is also full risk-sharing. They get a per capita home production
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δN. By the law of large numbers14 there is a mass nΩN of households in the E−island
and a mass (1− n)ΩN in the U−island. Households who lose their job (with a proba-
bility 1 − α) must travel from the E to the U−island at the end of the period, after the
consumption-saving choice has been made. Households finding a job (with a probability
1− ρ) have to travel from the U to the E−island at the end of the period. In each island, the
consumption-saving choice is made by a representative of the family head before knowing
who will leave the island, and who maximizes the welfare of the whole family. Finally, all
households traveling across islands can take their money with them. To consume, house-
holds go to the consumption island where they can anonymously exchange goods against
money, before going back to E or U-island, according to their employment status. Finally,
households cannot issue money.
Timing of events. The sequence of actions is the following. First, at the beginning of
each period, the family head pools the resources within all islands. The beginning-of-
period money-holding is mNEt in the E−island and mNUt in the U−island. Second, the
technology shock is revealed and production takes place. Third, the consumption-saving
choice is made and households travel to the consumption island. Fourth, households’
idiosyncratic shock is revealed, and households changing employment status travel across
islands, carrying their money with them.
Money flows. Denote as m˜NEt+1 the quantity of money chosen by the representative of
the family head in the E-island at the end of the current period (thus before the next
period pooling of resources). Similarly, m˜NUt+1 is the current end-of-period money choice
in the U−island. A measure (1− α) nΩN of households travels from island the E to the
U−island and the remaining measure αnΩN stays in island E. A measure (1− ρ) (1− n)ΩN
of households travels from island U to island E and the remaining measure ρ (1− n)ΩN
stays in island E. As a consequence, the per capita beginning-of-period quantity of money
in the E island is
mNEt+1 =
(
αnΩNm˜NEt+1 + (1− ρ) (1− n)ΩNm˜NUt+1
)
/
(
nΩN
)
14We assume that the law of large numbers is valid when applied to a continuum of variables. This law
is valid using the Feldman and Gilles, 1985 or Green, 1994 construction.
LIMITED PARTICIPATION, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 23
and similarly for U−island mNUt+1 =
(
(1− α) nΩNm˜NEt+1 + ρ (1− n)ΩNm˜NUt+1
)
/
(
(1− n)ΩN).
As (1− n) /n = (1− α) / (1− ρ), one easily finds:
mNEt+1 = αm˜
NE
t+1 + (1− α) m˜NUt+1 (24)
mNUt+1 = (1− ρ) m˜NEt+1 + ρm˜NUt+1 (25)
Program of the family head. The representative of the family head in both islands cares
about the total intertemporal welfare of the whole family. As a consequence, the program
of the family heads can be written compactly as15:
max
{cNEt ,cNUt ,m˜NEt+1,mNUt+1}t≥0
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
nΩNu
(
cNEt
)
+ (1− n)ΩNu
(
cNUt
))
where expectations are taken for the technology shock and subject to (for t ≥ 0):
cNEt + m˜
NE
t+1 =
mNEt
1 + pit
+ wt − τt (26)
cNUt + m˜
NU
t+1 =
mNUt
1 + pit
+ δN − τt (27)
m˜NEt+1, m˜
NU
t+1 ≥ 0 (28)
mNE0 , m
NU
0 given (29)
and subject to the laws of motion (24) and (25). The constraints (26) and (27) are respec-
tively the per capita budget constraint of households in the E−island and U−island, ex-
pressed in real terms. In each island, the resources are the per capita money holdings and
either the after-tax labor income or the after-tax home production. Inequality constraints
(28) stipulate that households cannot issue money. Finally, the initial conditions are given.
Using Lagrange coefficients, one easily finds the two constraints:
u′
(
cNEt
)
) ≥ βE
[
αu′
(
cNEt+1
)
+ (1− α) u′
(
cNUt+1
)] 1
1 + pit+1
, (30)
and m˜NEt+1 = 0 if u
′
(
cNEt
)
) > βE
[
αu′
(
cNEt+1
)
+ (1− α) u′
(
cNUt+1
)] 1
1 + pit+1
(31)
15As usual, in such a formulation cNEt , c
NU
t , m˜
NE
t+1, m
NU
t+1 should be thought of as a function of the history
of events up to period t, which is here the history of aggregate shock zt ≡ {z0, ...zt} (see Sargent, Lunqvist
2003). I skip the dependence on this history to ease the exposition.
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with
u
(
cNUt
)
= βE
[
(1− ρ) u′
(
cNEt+1
)
+ ρu′
(
cNUt+1
)] 1
1 + pit+1
, (32)
and m˜NUt+1 = 0 if u
(
cNUt
)
> βE
[
(1− ρ) u′
(
cNEt+1
)
+ ρu′
(
cNUt+1
)] 1
1 + pit+1
(33)
As was argued above, these Euler constraints have the same expression as the ones
found in full-fledged incomplete-market models. In particular, the saving decision is
made comparing per capita current marginal utility and future expected marginal utili-
ties, which differ according to the employment status, with the relevant transition proba-
bilities. The gain of the previous assumptions is that the beginning-of-period distribution
of money has only two mass points, mNEt and m
NU
t .
P−households
P−households face the same employment risk as N−households, with the transition
probabilities α and ρ. These households are more productive than N−households, and
the labor supply is equivalent to κ units of labor of N−households. The wage they receive
when employed is thus κwt. When unemployed they get a revenue from home production
equal to κδN. The parameter κ will be calibrated to match the empirical income distribu-
tion.
In addition, these households participate infrequently in financial markets16. It is as-
sumed that when they participate in period t the probability that they participate in pe-
riod t + 1 is α f (and the probability that they do not participate is 1− α f ). When they do
not participate in period t the probability that they do not participate in period t + 1 is ρ f
(and the probability that they participate is 1− ρ f ). Finally, participating and working are
two independent stochastic processes.
The fraction of participating P−households is nA = (1− ρ f ) / (2− α f − ρ f ), and the
fraction 1− nA does not participate. In addition, and as before, the fraction of employed
P−households is n, defined in (23), and the fraction 1− n is unemployed. Note that to
16The methodological contribution of this Section is to provide a simple formulation of the households’
problem under limited participation.
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make the model tractable, the first assumption is to consider the participation opportunity
as a Poisson process.
In addition, to keep the model simple17 , it is assumed that P−households can be in two
locations or ”islands”. All P−households who are either participating in financial markets
or employed are on the same island, denoted as the PA−island. In this island, the family
head pools resources and has access to the financial portfolio of the P−households. The
fraction of P-households on the PA−island is nPA = n + nA (1− nA).
P−households who both do not participate in financial markets and are unemployed
are located on another island, denoted the PU−island. In this island, there is a family head
who maximizes the welfare of all P−households, whatever their location. The measure
of P−households on PU−island is nPU = (1− nA) (1− n). Households know at the
end of each period if they are participating or if they are employed next period. They
have to move across islands accordingly, and can only take their money with them. As a
consequence, households only hold money in the PU−island.
Asset flows. The flows across islands are the following. The fraction of P−households
leaving the PU−island each period is the number of households who can either partici-
pate (and were not participating the previous period) or who find a job: nPU
(
1− ρ f )+
nPUρ f (1− ρ) = nPU (1− ρρ f ). The fraction of P−households leaving the PU−island
is denoted H and is thus H ≡ 1 − ρρ f . Denote as T the fraction of P−households
leaving the PA−island. Flow accounting implies, nPA = (1− T) nPA + HnPU, or T =
nPU
(
1− ρρ f ) /nPA. As a consequence, a measure TnPAΩP leaves the PA island for the
PU−island at the end of each period. The measure (1− T) nPAΩP stays in the PA−island.
Denote as kPAt , b
PA
t and m
PA
t , the per capita beginning-of-period capital, bonds and
money, respectively, in the PA−island. The end-of-period values (before agents move
across islands) are k˜PAt+1, b˜
PA
t+1 and m˜
PA
t+1. Denote as m
PU
t , the per capita beginning-of-period
17In a previous version of the paper, it was assumed that P-households could be in 4 different islands,
depending on being employed or unemployed, and participating or not. In addition one could easily intro-
duce an effort choice e in α f (e) to consider time-varying participation decision. The results are similar, at
the cost of a substantial increase in the number of equations.
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capital money in the PU−island (where the only asset is money). The end-of-period val-
ues (before agents move across islands) are m˜PUt+1. Following the same reasoning as for
N−agents, we find:
mPAt+1 = (1− T) m˜PAt+1 + Tm˜PUt+1 (34)
mPUt+1 =
(
1− ρρ f
)
m˜PAt+1 + ρ
f ρm˜PUt+1 (35)
Finally, as bonds and claims to the capital stock do not leave the PA island, we have:
kPAt+1 = k˜
PA
t+1 and b
PA
t+1 = b˜
PA
t+1
Program of the family head. The program of the representatives of the family head can be
written compactly, as:
max
{k˜PAt+1,b˜PAt+1,m˜PAt+1,m˜PUt+1,cPAt ,cPUt }t≥0
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
nPAu
(
cPAt
)
+
(
1− nPA
)
u
(
cPUt
))
subject to:
cPAt + k˜
PA
t+1 + b˜
PA
t+1 + m˜
PA
t+1 = κ
nwt + nA (1− n) δN
nPA
− τt (36)
+ (1 + rt) kPAt +
1 + it−1
1 + pit
bPAt +
mPAt
1 + pit
,
m˜PUt+1 + c
PU
t = κδ
N − τt + m
PU
t
1 + pit
(37)
m˜PAt+1, m˜
PU
t+1 ≥ 0 (38)
k˜PA0 , b˜
PA
0 , m˜
PA
0 , m˜
PU
0 given (39)
and the laws of motion (34) and (35). Equation (36) is the per capita budget constraint
in the PA island. Note that the per capita labor income κ nwt+n
A(1−n)δN
nPA takes into account
the share of unemployed agents in the PA island, which is nA (1− n) δN. Equation (37) is
the per capita budget constraint in the PU−island. Finally (38) are positive constraints on
money demand. Using Lagrange coefficients, one easily finds for the PA−island:
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u′
(
cPAt
)
= βE (1 + rt+1) u′
(
cPAt+1
)
(40)
u′
(
cPAt
)
= βE
1 + it
1 + pit+1
u′
(
cPAt+1
)
(41)
u′
(
cPAt
)
≥ βE
[
(1− T) u′
(
cPAt+1
)
+ Tu′
(
cPUt+1
)] 1
1 + pit+1
, (42)
and m˜PAt+1 = 0 if u
′
(
cPAt
)
> βE
[
(1− T) u′
(
cPAt+1
)
+ Tu′
(
cPUt+1
)] 1
1 + pit+1
u′
(
cPUt
)
≥ βE
[(
1− ρρ f
)
u′
(
cPAt+1
)
+ ρρ f u′
(
cPUt+1
)] 1
1 + pit+1
, (43)
and m˜PUt+1 = 0 if u
′
(
cPUt
)
> βE
[(
1− ρρ f
)
u′
(
cPAt+1
)
+ ρρ f u′
(
cPUt+1
)] 1
1 + pit+1
(44)
These equations summarize households’ portfolio choice with incomplete markets and
limited participation. The first two equations are the choices of bonds and of claims on the
capital stock. As households in the PA−island cannot bring their stock or bonds to other
islands, there is no self-insurance motive for these two assets. These assets are priced us-
ing the marginal utilities of participating households in each period. As a consequence,
the Euler equations for stock and bonds are the same as the ones of a representative agent.
This, again, will simplify the structure of the equilibrium. The third equation (42) deter-
mines the money choice of agents in the PA−island, which takes into account the fact that
money can be used by households moving to the other island, with the relevant transition
probabilities. Note that when T = 0, participating households always participate then
money would be held if its expected return is at least as high as for other financial assets.
In other words, the model does not deliver any role for money except the self-insurance
motive against bad idiosyncratic shocks. The last equation (43) determines the money
choice of agents in the PU islands, and it can be interpreted the same way.
2.3. Money creation, government budget and market equilibria. For the sake of realism,
the new money is created by open market operations. The central bank creates a nominal
quantity of money MCBt . The real quantity is m
CB
t = M
CB
t /Pt and it is used to buy a real
quantity bCBt+1 of assets by open market operation (to be consistent with the households
program, bCBt+1 = m
CB
t denotes the quantity of bonds bought in period t). Denote as M
tot
t
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the total nominal quantity of money. The law of motion of Mtott is simply M
tot
t = M
tot
t−1 +
MCBt , or in real terms:
mtott =
mtott−1
1 + pit
+ mCBt (45)
The real profits of the central bank (which bought a real quantity bCBt of public debt the
previous period) are Γt =
1+it−1
1+pit
bCBt . To keep the algebra simple, and without loss of
generality, we assume that b¯ = 0 and that there is no public spending. This implies that
the State gives back to households the profits of the central bank. As the population is
normalized to 1, this implies that taxes are:
τt = −1 + it−11 + pit m
CB
t−1 (46)
The capital and bond market equilibria are:
ΩPnPAbPAt + b
CB
t = 0, (47)
ΩPnPAkPAt = Kt, (48)
The two previous equations state that only P−households hold interest-bearing assets.
The goods market equilibrium is:
(1− n)ΩNcNUt + nΩNcNEt + nPUΩPcPUt + nPAΩPcPAt + Kt+1 = AKαt L1−αt + (1− λ) Kt
+ (1− n) δN
(
ΩN + κΩP
)
(49)
The labor market is, in efficient units:
Lt = n
(
ΩN + κΩP
)
(50)
Finally, the money market equilibrium is for t ≥ 1:
mtott = Ω
Nnm˜NEt +Ω
N (1− n) m˜NUt +ΩPnPAm˜At +ΩPnPUm˜PUt (51)
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2.4. Optimal monetary policy. We now derive the optimal monetary policy in this en-
vironment, assuming that the planner can commit to the optimal policy rule, as a first
benchmark. The instrument of the central planner is the quantity of money created in
each period mCBt . The planner gives a Pareto weight ωn = 1 to N- households and a
weight ωp to P−households (without loss of generality) . The Ramsey program for the
planner is the following maximization:
WCE = max
{mCBt }t=0..∞
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
ωNΩN
(
nNEu
(
cNEt
)
+ nNUu
(
cNUt
))
+ (52)
+ ΩPωp
(
nPAu
(
cPAt
)
+ nPUu
(
cPUt
))]
(53)
subject to six Euler equations (30)-(32) and (40)-(43), the four budget constraints (26), (27),
(36) and (37) the first-order conditions for the firm (22), the law of motion of the quantity
of money (8), the budget of the State (46), the five market equilibria (47)-(51), subject to
the law of motion of the technology shock given by (7), and given initial conditions.
Given initial capital stock K0, an equilibrium of this economy is a set
{cNEt , cNUt , cPAt , cPUt , mNEt , mPAt , bPAt+1, kPAt+1, Kt+1, rt, wt, mtott , mCBt , τt}t=0..∞ which solves the plan-
ner program given the above constraints. The steady-state economy is an economy where
At = 1 and where real variables are constant.
2.5. Equilibrium structure. The equilibrium is constructed with a guess-and-verify strat-
egy. Indeed, some households choose not to hold money because the return on money is
too low in the equilibrium under consideration. More specifically, I make the following
conjecture.
Conjecture 1: Households in U, PU island do not hold money, i.e.:
m˜NUt+1 = m˜
PU
t+1 = 0 (54)
This conjecture implies that only high-income households hold money. The equilibrium
conditions for this conjecture to be true are:
u′
(
cNUt
)
> βEt
[
(1− ρ) u′
(
cNEt+1
)
+ ρu′
(
cNUt+1
)] 1
1 + pit+1
(55)
u′
(
cPUt
)
> βEt
[(
1− ρρ f
)
u′
(
cPAt+1
)
+ ρρ f u′
(
cPUt+1
)] 1
1 + pit+1
(56)
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The conjecture will be proven at the steady state for the calibration provided below, and
then it will be checked that shocks are small enough such that this conjecture is satisfied
in the dynamics.
2.6. First best. To quantify the distortions, the first best allocation is also studied. The
unconstrained planner can provide the same consumption level to N and P households.
As before, we note x˜t for the value of xt chosen by the planner. The planner now chooses
the consumption of N and P households, c˜Nt and c˜
P
t . As before, the Pareto weight for N
households is normalized to 1. The objective is thus:
WFB = max
{c˜NMt ,c˜NPt ,c˜Pt ,K˜t+1}t=0..∞
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
ΩNu
(
c˜Nt
)
+ωpΩPu
(
c˜Pt
)]
(57)
Subject to the budget constraint:
K˜t+1 +ΩN c˜Nt +Ω
P c˜Pt
= AtK˜αt L
1−α + (1− λ) K˜t + (1− n) δN
(
ΩN + κΩP
)
with L given by (50). Solving the program, one finds as before c˜Nt = ω
− 1σ
p c˜Pt and:
u′
(
c˜pt
)
= βEt (1 + r˜t+1) u′
(
c˜pt+1
)
(58)
where 1+ r˜t is the period t marginal productivity of capital 1+ r˜t = µAtK˜
µ−1
t L
1−µ + 1− λ
2.7. Steady state. The next proposition presents steady-state properties to show the con-
ditions under which the conjecture equilibrium structure is valid.
Proposition 6. 1) The steady-state capital stock and aggregate consumption are the same in the
market and first-best allocation.
2) When pi∗ = 0, Conjecture 1 is fulfilled, and cPU∗ < cPA∗ and cNU∗ < cNE∗.
Proof. The proof is simple. First, the Euler equations (40) and (58) in steady state imply
1 + r˜∗ = 1 + r˜∗ = 1β . As a direct consequence, the steady-state level of capital stock
is optimal in the market economy, K∗ = K˜∗, and aggregate consumption (which can be
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deduced from the goods market equilibrium) is optimal, as in the simple model.
Second, under Conjecture 54, the two Euler equations (30) and (42) imply:
cPU∗
cPA∗
=
([
1 + pi∗
β
− 1 + T
]
1
T
)− 1σ
and
cNU
∗
cNE∗
=
([
1 + pi∗
β
− α
]
1
1− α
)− 1σ
.
Plugging these expressions in (55) and (56), one finds that the two conditions (55) and (56)
are fulfilled when 1+pi∗ > β (i.e. the economy is not at the Friedman rule), what includes
the case pi∗ = 0. 
When 1 + pi∗ > β then cPU∗ < cPA∗ and cNU∗ < cNE∗. Indeed, in this case it is costly
to self-insure using money because of inflation. Households thus rationally choose to
experience a fall in consumption in case of a bad idiosyncratic shock. The central planner
choosing the value pi∗ faces a trade-off between insurance and redistribution, and the
optimal value of pi∗ in the Ramsey problem will depend on ωp. As in the simple model
and as a normalization, I will choose the Pareto weight ωp such that the Ramsey problem
delivers an optimal steady-state net inflation rate equal to 0, when one constrains the
model to deliver a realistic amount of lack of insurance (see below).
2.8. Calibration and results. The period is a quarter. Preference parameters are set to
standard values. The discount factor is β = 0.99 and the curvature of the utility function
is σ = 2 (Hall, 2010. The production function is such that the capital share is µ = .36 and
the depreciation rate is λ = 0.025 (Cooley and Hansen, 1989 among others). The discount
factor determines the steady-state interest rate 1 + r∗ = 1/β, with equation (40). This and
the depreciation rate determine the steady-state capital stock and the steady-state wage
rate w∗ per efficient unit.
The steady-state inflation rate is assumed to be 0, pi∗ = 0, and Pareto weights are set
accordingly (see below).
Concerning the labor market, a quarterly job-separation rate and job-finding rate is es-
timated using Shimer (2005) methodology. The quarterly job-separation rate is 5%, such
that α = 0.95, and the quarterly job-finding rate is 79%, such that ρ = 0.21. The replace-
ment rate is calibrated to match the average money holdings of households in the Bottom
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50% of the income distribution. It implies a replacement rate of 0.46, which is close to the
one used by Shimer (2005). Concerning inequality in income, I take κ = 4.42 to match the
ratio of the income of the Top 50% over that of the Bottom 50% (see the targets below).
Two parameters, α f and ρ f , concern the participation structure in financial markets. To
my knowledge there is no direct estimation of the participation frequency of households
in financial markets. I follow the strategy of Alvarez and Lippi (2009) which is to calibrate
participation frequency to match some monetary moments of the data. First, I set ρ f = 0.5
and α f = 0.85 to match two targets. The first one is the ratio of money over income of
the top 50% households. The second one is an average fall in consumption of households
transiting from employment to unemployment of 5%. This value is in line with the finding
of Gruber (1997) of 7%. As a consequence, the model generates a realistic amount of
uninsurable risk for money holders, which is key for welfare analysis. This calibration
strategy implies that 77% of the P-households participate in financial markets each period,
and the probability not to participate next period, when participating, is 15%.
The process for technology is set to standard values. The persistence of technology
shock is set to ρa = 0.95 and the standard deviation is σa = 1% (Cooley and Hansen,
1989). The last parameter to be determined is the Pareto weights ωp. I choose ωp such
that the optimal inflation in the steady-state Ramsey problem is 0. This is a normaliza-
tion, as we set parameter values such that the model delivers a realistic amount of lack of
self-insurance (measured by the fall in consumption when experiencing a fall in income).
Solving the model numerically, one finds ωp = 3.33. Table 2 presents the parameter val-
ues.
As a summary, Table 3 presents the outcome for the four targets, which are used to
calibrate the four parameters κ, ρ f , α f and δN.
The model outcome for all relevant variables is provided in the Online Appendix OA5.
Money and wealth Distribution The model matches well by construction the money (M1)
distribution for both type of agents. The top 50% hold 12.7% of their annual income in
money and the bottom 50% hold 9.5% of their income in money, both in the data and in
the model. As a consequence, the model reproduces a relevant amount of money held by
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TABLE 2. Parameter values
Population (%) and Pareto weight Preferences and technology
ΩN ΩP ωp β σ µ λ ρa σa
50 50 3.33 .99 2 .36 .025 .95 .01
Income structure Uninsurable risk
κ δN/w α ρ α f ρ f
4.42 0.46 .95 .21 .85 .5
TABLE 3. Calibration targets and model outcome
Data Model
Annual income T50/B50 5.3 5.3
Money/Annual Income T50 12.7 12.7
Money/Annual Income B50 9.5 9.5
Fall in consump. for unempl. 7% 5%
households. Finally, all financial wealth is held by the top 50% which is a consistent rep-
resentation of the data (see Bricker et al., 2014 for the discussion of the wealth distribution
using the SCF survey)
Model resolution. The gain of the assumptions made above is that the model is easy to
solve numerically. In particular, to derive the optimal Ramsey policy, I consider a second-
order approximation of the welfare objective and a first-order approximation of the con-
straints. Standard linear-quadratic methods allow deriving the optimal monetary policy
of the central planner. It is then possible to compute the steady-state inflation rate gener-
ated by the solution of the Ramsey problem, as a function of the Pareto weight. I iterate
over the Pareto weight until the steady-state optimal inflation rate is 0.
2.8.1. The effect of optimal monetary policy. To understand the trade-offs faced by mone-
tary policy in this environment, the optimal monetary policy after a positive technology
shock is now derived. Three economies are compared. The first one is the Ramsey alloca-
tion, where the planner solves the Ramsey problem (52). The second one is the first-best
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FIGURE 1. Outcomes of the three economies after the same technology shock
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Note: The green dotted line is the market economy with inactive monetary policy
(mCB = 0). The blue solid line is the market economy with a constrained efficient
monetary policy. The red dotted line is the first-best allocation.
allocation, where the central planner is unconstrained and can implement the first best
allocation. The third one is an inactive-policy allocation where monetary policy is inac-
tive, i.e. the nominal money stock is constant. In this last economy, we impose that mCBt
is 0. As the Pareto weights have been chosen such that the optimal steady-state inflation
rate solving the Ramsey problem is 0, the steady-state inflation is the same in the Ramsey
and the inactive-policy allocations. As a consequence, the gain of an active monetary pol-
icy is only the result of its ability to affect the business cycle and is not the outcome of a
reduction in steady-state distortions.
We plot in Figure 1 the main variables in the three economies after the same technology
shock.
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The first panel (A), presents the technology shock At, as percentage deviation from the
steady-state value. The second panel (Mcb) presents optimal money created mCBt when the
central planner solves the Ramsey program. Optimal monetary policy is countercyclical.
It reduces the money in circulation after a positive technology shock. Although aggregate
consumption is increasing in the three economies (as represented in the third panel (C)
of the first line), optimal monetary policy reduces the increase in consumption compared
to the inactive-policy allocation. The first-best increase in consumption is even smaller.
Optimal monetary policy generates an additional increase in the capital stock (compared
to the inactive-policy allocation, as can be seen in the Panel (K)), although less than its
level in the first-best allocation. Optimal monetary policy increases the capital stock by
5% at peak. It thus generates ”forced saving”. Panel (tau) are taxes and Panel (pi) is the
expected inflation rate.
Comparing Ramsey and inactive-policy allocations, one can see that the contractionary
monetary policy is a transfer from N−households to P−households. In the Ramsey al-
location, the consumption of employed N−households (who are the non-participating
money holders) is cNE and is represented in the Panel (cne). This consumption is lower
than the one in the inactive-policy allocation. In addition, the consumption of P-households
who are participating in financial markets (cPA represented in Panel (cpa)) is higher in the
Ramsey allocation than in the inactive-policy allocation. These P-households save more
after the technology shock in the Ramsey allocation than in the inactive-policy allocation,
as can be seen from the path of the aggregate shock.
Optimal monetary policy thus increases the capital stock after such a shock, but unde-
sirable redistributive effects limit the ability to restore the first best capital dynamics. To
see this, Panel (cp/cn) plots consumption inequalities as the ratio of total consumption
of participating households over total consumption of non-participating households. The
average consumption of participating households is higher than that of non-participating
households (who don’t hold the capital stock). As a consequence, the graph shows that
consumption inequality decreases less in the Ramsey allocation than in the inactive-policy
allocation. In other words, the contractionary monetary policy contributes to an increase
in inequality, which is consistent with recent empirical findings (Coibion, Gorodnichenko,
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TABLE 4. Second-order moments of key variables
Economies Variables
K (%) Ctot(%) corr(Ctott−1, Ctott )
Inactive-policy 3.03 13.1 0.988
Ramsey 3.15 13.0 0.990
First-best 3.26 13.0 0.992
Kueng and Silvia, 2012). The change in inequality in the first best allocation is not plotted,
as consumption inequality is constant in this case.
Before presenting the welfare implications, Table 4 reports the second-order moments
of aggregate variables for the three allocations. The volatility of the capital stock is higher
in the Ramsey allocation compared to the inactive-policy allocation, but it remains lower
than in the first best allocation. This implies that the volatility of aggregate consumption
falls in the Ramsey allocation compared to the inactive-policy allocation. In other words,
the capital stock does not react enough (and consumption reacts too much) to the technol-
ogy shock when monetary policy is inactive. In addition, the autocorrelation of aggregate
consumption increases in the Ramsey allocation, compared to the inactive-policy alloca-
tion: More volatile capital stock translates into smoother aggregate consumption, because
it is a way to save more in good times (and less in bad times), as can be seen from Figure
1.
2.8.2. Welfare gains of an active monetary policy. One can compute the welfare gains of an
active monetary policy (i.e. solving the Ramsey program) compared to an inactive mone-
tary policy, for both P and N households. I follow the standard measure of consumption
equivalent in the heterogeneous-agents literature. I first compute the average welfare for
the inactive allocation of N−households by simulating the economy with inactive policy
for 10,000 periods.
I then compute the ex-ante welfare as WNIN = ∑
∞
t=0 β
t
(
nNEu
(
cNEIN,t
)
+ nNUu
(
cNUIN,t
))
(where IN stands for the inactive-policy allocation). Similarly, I compute the ex-ante wel-
fare of P households in the inactive allocation WPIN = ∑
∞
t=0 β
t
(
nPAu
(
cPAIN,t
)
+ nPUu
(
cPUIN,t
))
.
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I then compute the ex-ante welfare for the Ramsey allocation by simulating the economy
where the central planner solves the Ramsey problem for 10,000 periods. I can similarly
compute the ex-ante welfare of the P and N households in the Ramsey allocation. This
gives WNRamsey and W
P
Ramsey. The consumption equivalent is the average increase in con-
sumption that N and P households would need to enjoy in the inactive-policy allocation to
have the same ex-ante welfare as in the Ramsey allocation. Mathematically, one computes
∆N and ∆P such that:
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
nNEu
(
cNEIN,t
(
1 + ∆N
))
+ nNUu
(
cNUIN,t
(
1 + ∆N
)))
= WNRamsey
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
nPAu
(
cPAR,t
(
1 + ∆P
))
+ nPUu
(
cPUR,t
(
1 + ∆P
)))
= WPRamsey
One finds that ∆N = 0.39% and ∆P = 0.19%. Optimal monetary policy increases the
welfare of both types of agents, but it increases the welfare of N−households more than
the welfare of P−households. Monetary policy increases consumption smoothing (which
is not optimal because some households do not participate in financial markets). This
benefits relatively more N−households, who do not have access to financial markets. Note
that the welfare gains are much higher than the gains from eliminating business cycles in
representative agent economies.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper derives implications for optimal monetary policy of limited participation in
financial markets, as a key friction to understand money demand. The distortions gener-
ated by this simple friction are surprisingly complex. Investment can be either too high or
too low in the business cycle compared to the first best allocation. Indeed, participating
agents don’t face the optimal wealth effect after technology shocks. The optimal policy is
not to distort the marginal return on investment, but to generate time-varying redistribu-
tion. As a consequence, the redistributive effect of monetary policy is actually a tool to
improve capital accumulation.
In the more general model matching a stylized money distribution, it has been shown
that the market economy underinvests after a typical technology shock, when monetary
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policy is inactive. In this setup, monetary policy is countercyclical : optimal money cre-
ation falls after a positive technology shock, but it has to balance a positive effect on capital
accumulation and undesirable redistributive effects.
The additional interest of the general model is to present a tractable incomplete in-
surance market model with limited participation, which generates a simple but realistic
distribution of money. The model is simple enough to perform a welfare analysis with
aggregate shocks. Admittedly, this model is not a full-fledged quantitative analysis of the
business cycle, as many other relevant ingredients for business cycle analysis are miss-
ing. An obvious path for future work is to introduce other frictions in this model, such as
nominal frictions or a search-and-matching model of the labor market, to study their in-
teraction with limited participation. These interactions may help to think about important
trade-offs for monetary policy and concerning capital accumulation.
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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Using the equations for the optimal program (Equations 15 and 17), one finds 1+ r˜∗ = 1β
and K˜∗ = L (Ω) (βµ)1/(1−µ), the same values as in the market economy. As a consequence,
K∗ = K˜∗ and Y = Y˜∗, and total consumption is the same in both economy Ctot∗ = C˜tot∗.
The central planner allocation implies c˜n∗/c˜p∗ = ω−
1
σ
p . The market allocation is, when
pi = 0 :
cp∗ =
(
µ (1− β) 1−Ω/2
1−Ω + 1− µ
)
(βµ)
µ
1−µ and cn∗ = w∗ = (1− µ) (µβ)
µ
1−µ
As total consumption is the same in the market economy and for the optimal allocation, a
necessary and sufficient condition to have cn∗ = c˜n∗ and cp∗ = c˜p∗ is c˜p∗/c˜n∗ = cp∗/cn∗.
Using the three previous equations, this condition can be written as the one given by
equality (18).
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 2
To prove the proposition, the solution of the linear model is compared to the solution
of the linearized equations characterizing the first best allocation. The proportional de-
viation of the variables xt to its steady-state value is denoted xˆt, that is xt = x∗ (1 + xˆt) .
Linearizing and simplifying the model (3)-(6), (11) and (13), one finds that the dynamic of
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the economy is a simple two-equation model, based on the two variables cˆpt and Kˆt:
Et cˆ
p
t+1 − cˆpt =
µ− 1
σ
Kˆt+1 +
1
σ
Etat+1 (59)
Kˆt+1 + (θ (Ω)− 1) cˆpt = θ (Ω)
(
µKˆt + at
)
(60)
where the coefficient θ (Ω) stands for:
θ (Ω) ≡ 1
β
(
1 + (1−Ω) 1− µ
µL (Ω)
)
The coefficient θ (Ω) is higher than 1, θ (Ω) > 1 and decreasing inΩ. It captures the fact
that a part of the return on the capital stock is paid in wages to non-participating agents.
Knowing the value of the capital stock, the consumption of non-participating households
is simply (using the expression of the real wage):
cˆnt = at + µKˆt (61)
The linearization of the equations characterizing the first best allocation yields:
Et̂˜cpt+1 − ̂˜cpt = µ− 1σ ̂˜Kt + 1σEat+1 (62)(
1
µβ
− 1
)̂˜cpt + ̂˜Kt+1 = 1µβ (at + µ ̂˜Kt+1) (63)
and the consumption of non-participating households is simply, from the optimal con-
sumption allocation (16): ̂˜cnt = ̂˜cpt (64)
Comparing the market economy (59)-(60) and the optimal allocation characterized by
(62)-(63), one finds that the Euler equation has the same expression in the two economies.
The only difference lies in the budget constraint. In the market economy the budget
constraint is modified because a part of the return of capital is given as a wage to non-
participating agents. The two equations are the same when Ω = 0, as θ (0) = 1/ (βµ), as
can be expected: when all agents participate in financial markets, the market economy is
optimal.
Consider the dynamic system (59)-(60). Using (60), one can substitute cˆpt in (59), to
obtain a single equation in Kˆt, Kˆt+1 and Kˆt+2. Using the method of unknown coefficients,
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one finds that the capital stock has the form:
Kˆt+1 = B (σ, θ (Ω)) Kˆt + Da (σ, θ (Ω) , ρa) at (65)
where ρa is the persistence of the technology shock, and where :
B (σ, θ) ≡ 1
2σ
((1− µ (1− σ)) θ + µ+ σ− 1) (66)
− 1
2
√
1
σ2
((1− µ (1− σ)) θ + µ+ σ− 1)2 − 4θµ
Da (σ, θ, ρ) ≡ θ +
ρ
σ (θ (1− σ)− 1)
1
σ ((1− µ (1− σ)) θ + µ+ σ− 1)− B (σ, θ)− ρ
(67)
Comparing (59)-(60) and (62)-(63), on can observe that the optimal and market alloca-
tions are the same whenΩ = 0 because θ (0) = 1/(µβ). One thus directly find the optimal
low of motion of the capital stock:
̂˜Kt+1 = B˜ ̂˜Kt + D˜aat with B˜, D˜a > 0 (68)
with B˜ = B (σ, θ (0)) and D˜a = Da (σ, θ (0) , ρ).
Moreover, when σ = 1, whatever the value of θ (and thus of Ω), one finds B (1, θ) = µ
and D (1, θ, ρ) = 1. As the consequence, the dynamics of the capital stock is the same in
both economies. It is then easy to show that the consumption of both P and N−households
is the same in both economies (using the good-market equilibrium), what concludes the
proof.
APPENDIX C. PROOF OF THE PROPOSITION 3
Denote as ∂xˆt∂εa the increase in the contemporaneous proportional deviation of the vari-
able xˆt due to a marginal increase in the innovation in the TFP process.
Assume that σ = 1 + ε with ε small such that a first order expansion of B (1 + ε, θ) and
Da (1 + ε, θ, ρ) in ε is relevant. From (66) and (67). One finds
B (ε, θ) = µ+ (µ− 1) (θ − 1) 1
2
(
1− 1
(θ + µ) (θ − µ)
)
ε
Da (ε, θ, ρ) = 1 +
θ − 1
θ − ρ
(
(1− µ) θ
θ − µ − ρ
)
ε
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Using (61), the dynamic of consumption can be written as ∂ĉ
n
∂εa = 1 and plugging the
expression of Kˆt+1 given by (65), in the budget constraint of P−households (60), one finds
cˆpt =
θ−Da
θ−1 at +
θµ−B
θ−1 Kˆt. Hence
∂ĉp
∂εa
=
θ − Da (ε, θ, ρ)
θ − 1 (69)
As the solution of the optimal program for the P−households is the same as the one in
the market economy for θ (0), one has from (69):
∂ĉp
∂εa
=
θ (Ω)− Da (ε, θ (Ω) , ρ)
θ (Ω)− 1 and
∂̂˜cp
∂εa
=
θ (0)− Da (ε, θ (0) , ρ)
θ (0)− 1
Recall that θ (Ω) is decreasing in Ω, hence θ (Ω) < θ (0) for Ω > 0. Moreover, from (65)
and (68), one has:
∂ ̂˜K
∂εa
= Da (ε, θ (0) , ρ) and
∂Kˆ
∂εa
= Da (ε, θ (Ω) , ρ)
The proof relies on the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. There is a ρ¯ > 0, such that
If ρ < ρ¯, Da (σ, θ (Ω) , ρ) < D˜a (σ, θ (0) , ρ)
If ρ > ρ¯, Da (σ, θ, ρ) > D˜a (σ, θ (0) , ρ)
Proof of the Lemma. For small ε :
Da (σ, θ, ρ) = 1 +
θ − 1
θ − ρ
(
(1− µ) θ
θ − µ − ρ
)
ε
Using the previous expression, one finds:
1
ε
∂
∂θ
Da (σ, θ, ρ) =
(
1− ρ
θ − ρ
(
(1− µ) θ
θ − µ − ρ
)
− (θ − 1) (1− µ) µ
(θ − µ)2
)
1
θ − ρ
Define F (ρ) ≡ 1−ρθ−ρ
(
(1− µ) θθ−µ − ρ
)
− (θ − 1) (1− µ) µ
(θ−µ)2 . From the previous ex-
pression, the sign of ∂∂θD
a (σ, θ, ρ) is the sign of F (ρ) .
If ρ > θ 1−µθ−µ then F (ρ) < 0.
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If ρ < (1− µ) θθ−µ then F (ρ) is decreasing and continuous in ρ., F (0) > 0 and F
(
(1− µ) θθ−µ
)
<
0. As a consequence, there is a ρ¯ > 0, such that F (ρ) > 0 if ρ < ρ¯ and F (ρ) < 0 if ρ > ρ¯.
As a consequence
∂
∂θ
Da (σ, θ, ρ) > 0 if ρ < ρ¯
∂
∂θ
Da (σ, θ, ρ) < 0 if ρ > ρ¯
Hence, ifρ < ρ¯, then Da (σ, θ (Ω) , ρ) < Da (σ, θ (0) , ρ), and the reverse when ρ > ρ¯,
what concludes the proof of the Lemma.
To conclude the proof of the proposition, one can use the lemma to rank the impact
response for ĉp, ̂˜cp, ̂˜K and Kˆ.
APPENDIX D. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Define as g˜
(
At, K˜t
)
the optimal decision rule of the central planner : K˜t+1 = g˜
(
At, K˜t
)
,
solving the program (15) and (17) and which is uniquely defined by standard dynamic
programming argument. Assume that in the market economy the money supply follows
the rule mCBt = H (Ω, At, Kt) where,
H (Ω, At, Kt) ≡
((
(1− µ) 1−Ω
1− Ω2
+ µ
)
(K∗)µ L1−µ − K∗
)(
AtK˜
µ
t L
1−µ − g˜ (At, K˜t)
(K∗)µ L1−µ − K∗
)
−
(
(1− µ) 1−Ω
1− Ω2
+ µ
)
AtK
µ
t L
1−µ + g˜ (At, Kt)
Although this expression is complex, it is only a function of the past state variables Kt, and
on the current technology shock At. I now shown that the first best allocation is a solution
of the program of all agents in the market economy, when monetary policy follows the
previous rule. As a consequence, optimal monetary policy can implement the first best18.
The proof is done in two steps.
First, using the budget constraint of participating households (3) and (9), one finds that
the budget constraint of participating households can be written as a simple system in cpt
18It has been check that the first best allocation is the only possible equilibrium in a first order approxi-
mation of the dynamics. In other words, the equilibrium is locally unique.
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and Kt (plugging the expression of H and using c˜p∗ = cp∗)(
Ω
2
(
ωp
)− 1σ + (1−Ω)) cpt = AtKµt L1−µ− g˜ (At, Kt)+ Ω2 (ωp)−
1
σ + (1−Ω)
1−Ω (g˜ (At, Kt)− Kt+1)
Second, we can show that the optimal decision rule Kt+1 = g˜ (At, Kt) (the one derived
from the solution of the program of the central planner) is a solution to the problem of
participating households. Indeed, the program of these households can be written as
u′
(
cpt
)
= βEt
(
µAt+1K
µ−1
t+1 L
1−µ
)
u′
(
cpt+1
)
Kt+1 +
(
Ω
2
(
ωp
)− 1σ + (1−Ω)) cpt = AtKµt L1−µ + 12 Ω1−Ω (ωp)− 1σ (g˜ (At, Kt)− Kt+1)
One recognizes the program of the central planer (17) and the budget constraint given
in Section 1.4, with an extra term at the right hand side 12
Ω
1−Ω
(
ωp
)− 1σ (g˜ (At, Kt)− Kt+1),
which is nul when Kt+1 = g˜ (At, Kt). As a consequence, if Kt+1 = g˜ (At, Kt) is a solution
of the central planner program, it is also a solution of the program of P−households in
the limited-participation economy. Hence, cpt = c˜
p
t and Kt = K˜t and c
n
t = c˜
n
t by the goods
market equilibrium.
